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Abstract:  
This paper characterizes the optimal inflation buffer consistent with a zero lower bound on 
nominal interest rates in a New Keynesian sticky-price model. It is shown that a purely 
forward-looking version of the model that abstracts from inflation inertia would significantly 
underestimate the inflation buffer. If the central bank follows the prescriptions of a welfare-
theoretic objective, a larger buffer appears optimal than would be the case employing a 
traditional loss function. Taking also into account potential downward nominal rigidities in 
the price-setting behavior of firms appears not to impose significant further distortions on the 
economy. 
 
 
 
JEL Classification: C63, E31, E52 
 
 
Keywords: Inflation Inertia, Downward Nominal Rigidity, Nonlinear Policy, Liquidity Trap 1 Introduction
The recent years have witnessed a general success of central banks of major
world economies in conquering inﬂation. Consequently, a renewed interest
has emerged among academics and policymakers in a more systematic analy-
sis of how to conduct monetary policy in low inﬂation environments, where
lower average levels of nominal interest rates increase the likelihood of the
zero bound being a binding constraint.1 Questions that immediately arise
are: How can the central bank stimulate aggregate demand in the economy
if it cannot lower nominal interest rates any further? And what should the
central bank do to minimize the chances that the economy might fall into a
situation of zero nominal interest rates?
The relevant literature has been able to sketch the following answers
to these questions: When zero nominal interest rates are reached, the cen-
tral bank can still continue to reduce real rates and stimulate aggregate
demand by generating inﬂationary expectations.2 To prevent the economy
from falling into a situation of zero nominal rates in the ﬁrst place, the central
bank should sustain a higher long-run average rate of inﬂation than would be
the case without the lower bound. In addition to adopting such an inﬂation
‘buﬀer,’ the central bank should act in a ‘preemptive’ fashion, turning more
expansionary and aggressive already when adverse shocks threaten to push
the economy into a situation of zero nominal rates.3
The main contribution of this paper is to show that there is a crucial
aspect of the design of monetary policy in a low inﬂation, low interest rate
1In principle achieving negative nominal rates is feasible, e.g., if one is willing to give
up free convertibility of deposits and other ﬁnancial assets into cash or if one could levy
a tax on money holdings, see Buiter and Panigirtzoglou (2003) and Goodfriend (2000).
However, a general consensus on the applicability of such policy measures seems not to
have been reached yet.
2The key insight that the management of private-sector expectations by the central
bank can mitigate the eﬀects of the zero lower bound can be traced back to Krugman
(1998). Bernanke and Reinhart (2004) argue that central banks do understand the im-
portance of inﬂuencing market expectations of future policy actions. Empirical evidence
that the Federal Reserve has been successful in this is provided by Bernanke, Reinhart
and Sack (2004).
3A more detailed review of the literature follows in section 2.
2e n v i r o n m e n tt h a ts of a rh a sn o tb e e nd e a l tw i t h : W h a ta r et h ei m p l i c a -
tions of a high degree of inﬂation persistence, as actually observed in major
world economies, for the determination of the optimal inﬂation buﬀer and
preemptive policy action?
T oa d d r e s st h i si s s u e ,t h ef r a m e w o r ka d o p t e di sav e r s i o no ft h ew e l l -
known New Keynesian sticky-price model, where inﬂation is also partly deter-
mined by past inﬂation, see Clarida, Galí and Gertler (1999) and Woodford
(2003). The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy accounting for the high
degree of inﬂation persistence as actually observed in the data, e.g., Chris-
tiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) and Giannoni and Woodford (2003).
From a technical point of view, the policy problem as studied in this paper
simultaneously addresses three speciﬁc features, each of which signiﬁcantly
aggravates its solution. These features are the occasionally binding con-
straint on the policy instrument, the standard conditions of uncertainty, and
the forward-looking nature of the model. Only recently, nonlinear numerical
methods apt to solving this general class of problems have been developed,
see Adam and Billi (2003a) for the purely forward-looking case.
Anticipating the main ﬁndings, it is shown that the optimal inﬂation
buﬀer is increasing in the degree of inﬂation inertia, and purely forward-
looking models may severely underestimate its relevance. Assuming the
central bank aims at minimizing a traditional loss function would entail a
somewhat smaller buﬀer, than with a welfare-theoretic objective. Taking
also into account potential downward nominal rigidities in the price-setting
behavior of ﬁrms appears not to increase signiﬁcantly the buﬀer. Interest-
ingly, at the lower bound output losses may be accompanied by inﬂation,
rather than deﬂation, because of the forward-looking nature of expectations
in the model.4
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews
the related literature. Section 3 introduces the policy problem and its cali-
bration. Section 4 illustrates the optimal policy, thereby revealing the eﬀects
4Demand shortfalls and deﬂation are features commonly associated with the concept
of a ‘liquidity trap.’
3of inﬂation inertia on the optimal buﬀer. Section 5 considers alternative
policy objectives. Section 6 introduces potential downward nominal rigidity.
Section 7 brieﬂy concludes. The appendix explains the solution method and
the numerical algorithm employed.
2 Related Literature
The relevance of the zero lower bound for the determination of the optimal
inﬂation rate in the economy has been noted by Phelps (1972) and Sum-
mers (1991). The buﬀer role of inﬂation and preemptive policy action ﬁnd
support also in Bernanke (2000). Faust and Henderson (2004) argue that
determining how large an inﬂation buﬀer to allow is a technical question and
the answer may change over time as the economy changes; therefore, they
suggest keeping the choice of the inﬂation target in the hands of the central
bank and for revisiting it periodically.
A number of recent papers examine how monetary policy should be con-
ducted in the presence of a zero lower bound on nominal interest rates.5
One strand of the literature examines the performance of simple policy
rules. Among these are Fuhrer and Madigan (1997), Coenen, Orphanides
and Wieland (2004), and Reifschneider and Williams (2000) that study dy-
namic rational expectation models employing simulation methods. Wolman
(2004) adopts a general equilibrium framework. This set of papers shows
that with a targeted inﬂation rate close enough to zero simple policy rules
formulated in terms of inﬂation rates, e.g., the ‘Taylor rule’ (1993), can gen-
erate signiﬁcant real distortions.6 Pursuing instead a target rate of inﬂation
5Rotemberg and Woodford (1998) and Smets (2003), among others, address the lower
bound constraint only indirectly by penalizing policies resulting in exceedingly variable
nominal interest rates. This approach has the advantage of preserving the simplicity of
standard linear-quadratic approximation methods. But comes at the cost of neglecting
the asymmetry that is inherent in the interest rate policy.
6Reifschneider and Williams (2000) and Wolman (2004) ﬁnd also that simple policy
rules formulated in terms of a price level target, rather than an inﬂation target, can yield
a dramatic reduction of the real distortions associated with the zero lower bound. In
fact, price level rules build in an oﬀset to past deviations from the rule itself, introducing
into the central bank’s policy actions a form of ‘history-dependence’ that relates to policy
4larger than zero can reduce the distortions in the stochastic properties of the
economy. But how to determine the optimal size of such an inﬂation target
remains an open question, addressed by the current paper.
Another strand of the literature examines the design of optimal mone-
tary policy in models with backward-looking expectations. Orphanides and
Wieland (2000) and Kato and Nishiyama (2003) characterize optimal mone-
tary policy in stochastic dynamic rational expectation models where private-
sector expectations about future policy actions play no role. These papers
show that ‘preemptive’ easing is optimal in the run-up to a binding lower
bound even if the central bank cannot intervene in the economy through the
expectational channel by promising inﬂation.
However, key to eﬀective central-bank action is the ‘management of ex-
pectations’ on future policy actions, see Krugman (1998). Building on this
insight, a further set of papers study the purely forward-looking version of the
standard New Keynesian sticky-price model. Jung, Teranishi and Watanabe
(2001) and Eggertsson and Woodford (2003) consider the deterministic setup
and very special cases of the stochastic shock processes, respectively. But
‘preemptive’ easing of optimal policy arises from having uncertainty about
the future state of the economy. Adam and Billi (2003a) oﬀer a rigorous
treatment of optimal policy design under standard conditions of uncertainty
in the purely forward-looking model.
The optimal monetary policy in the New Keynesian sticky-price model
when the central bank is unable to commit to future plans is characterized by
Adam and Billi (2003b).7 Discretionary policy making gives rise to a down-
ward bias in the average inﬂation rate.8 Aiming for a positive inﬂation target
can alleviate the lower bound constraint, but has to be weighed against the
additional welfare costs being imposed on the economy. Already a modest
making under commitment.
7Wether policymakers can and may want to credibly commit to future plans is currently
subject of debate, see Orphanides (2003).
8Krugman (1998) seems to have been the ﬁrst to note that under discretion the lower
bound may generate a ‘deﬂation bias.’
5degree of inﬂation inertia signiﬁcantly ampliﬁes the demand shortfalls and
deﬂation that arise at zero nominal rates. Instead in the current paper it
is shown that higher inﬂation indexation might lead to an inﬂationary path
at the lower bound. This counter intuitive result is explained by the abil-
ity of the central bank to generate inﬂationary expectations under policy
commitment.
In this paper the interest rate is assumed to be the only available policy
instrument.9 T h er o l eo ft h ee x c h a n g er a t ea n do fq u a n t i t y - b a s e dm o n e t a r y
policies in mitigating the distortions imposed by the lower bound is ana-
lyzed, among others, by Auerbach and Obstfeld (2003), Coenen and Wieland
(2003), McCallum (2003), and Svensson (2003). Eggertsson and Woodford
(2004) study the implications of optimal ﬁscal policy in the form of distor-
tionary taxation. These papers however do not address the issue of how to
characterize the optimal inﬂation buﬀer.
3 Model and Calibration
This section introduces the optimal policy problem and illustrates the cali-
bration to the U.S. economy.
3 . 1 M o n e t a r yP o l i c yP r o b l e m
A standard dynamic general equilibrium framework with nominal rigidities
from staggered price-setting behavior of ﬁrms is considered. It is well-known
in the literature as the ‘New Keynesian’ model, as described by Clarida, Galí
and Gertler (1999) and Woodford (2003).
Log-linearizing the model around the deterministic steady-state, apart
from the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates, reduces it to a two-
equation system: an aggregate-supply relation capturing the price-setting
behavior of ﬁr m s ;a n da ni n t e r t e m p o r a lI Sr e lation describing the private
9Indirectly, also ‘promises’ that have to be kept form past commitments can be thought
of as policy instruments, see appendix A.1.
6expenditure decisions of households.10 This otherwise standard monetary
policy problem is here augmented by explicitly imposing the lower bound,
kept in its original nonlinear form.
The policy problem of the central bank is:
max
(yt,πt,it)
− E0
∞ X
t=0
β
t ¡
(πt − θπt−1)
2 + αy
2
t
¢
(1)
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πt =
1
1+βθ
[βEtπt+1 + θπt−1 + λyt] (2)
yt = Etyt+1 − σ(it − Etπt+1 − r
n
t ) (3)
r
n
t =( 1− ρr)¯ r + ρrr
n
t−1 + ε
r
t (4)
it ≥ 0 (5)
where πt denotes the quarterly inﬂation rate and yt the output gap, i.e.,
the deviation of output from its ‘natural’ ﬂexible-price equilibrium. The
quarterly nominal interest rate it is the instrument of monetary policy.
The welfare-theoretic objective of the central bank, equation (1), is a
quadratic (second-order Taylor series) approximation to the expected utility
of the representative household. Where β ∈ (0,1) is the discount factor and
the weight α>0 depends on the underlying structure of the economy.11 The
model abstract from the transaction frictions and money demand distortions
associated with positive nominal interest rates.
Equation (2) is a deterministic aggregate-supply relation, that allows for
backward-looking indexation of individual prices to an aggregate price in-
10The reader is referred to Woodford (2003) for further discussion of the foundations of
the New Keynesian model.
11With inﬂation inertia from backward-looking indexation of individual prices to an
aggregate price index, ﬁrms that do not reoptimize their prices raise them mechanically
by an amount θπt−1. To reduce the distortions associated with price dispersion it is thus
t h ec h a n g ei nt h er a t eo fi n ﬂation, πt − θπt−1,r a t h e rt h a ni n ﬂation, πt,t h a th a st ob e
stabilized around zero, see Ch. 6 in Woodford (2003).
7dex. Where λ>0 is the slope parameter, that depends on the underlying
structure of the economy, and θ ∈ (0,1) indicates the degree of indexation
to the aggregate price index. For θ =0equation (2) reduces to the purely
forward-looking case. For θ>0 inﬂation is partly determined by lagged
inﬂation, which becomes an endogenous state variable of the model. This
follows Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) in addressing the sub-
stantial criticism directed at the purely forward-looking version of the New
Keynesian stick-price model for its inability to capture the high persistence
that inﬂation displays in the data.
The model abstracts from so-called ‘cost-push’ shocks that would shift
the aggregate-supply relation.12 Therefore, without a zero lower bound con-
straint on the nominal interest rate there would be no tension between the
two goals of inﬂation and output stabilization. This simpliﬁes the solution
of the problem, since introducing exogenous ‘cost-push’ shocks would add
an additional state variable to the model.13 It also has an important ad-
vantage in terms of interpreting the results. The distortions observed in the
stochastic properties of the economy are arising only from the lower bound.
Moreover, equation (3) is a stochastic intertemporal IS relation, where
σ>0 denotes the real interest rate elasticity of output. Equation (4) de-
scribes the evolution of the exogenous ‘natural’ real-rate of interest shock
rn
t .14 It is assumed to follow an AR(1) process with autoregressive coeﬃcient
ρr ∈ (0,1) and equilibrium value ¯ r.T h ei n n o v a t i o nεr
t is assumed normally
distributed with zero mean. The quarterly discount factor is implied by the
relation β =( 1+¯ r)
−1.
Equation (5) represents the zero lower bound on nominal interest rates,
kept in its original nonlinear form. Importantly, in this otherwise linear-
12Such disturbances could be interpreted as variations over time in the degree of mo-
nopolistic competition between ﬁrms.
13The model already has four state variables, see appendix A.1, and solving it is tech-
nically challenging.
14The disturbance rn
t summarizes all shocks that under ﬂexible prices generate time
variation in the real interest rate. Therefore, it captures the combined eﬀects of preference
shocks, productivity shocks, and exogenous changes in government expenditure.
8quadratic policy problem certainty equivalence breaks down. The long-run
average rate of inﬂation ¯ π does not necessarily coincide with the determin-
istic steady-state rate of inﬂation πss,i np r a c t i c eπss ≤ ¯ π.15 This lends
to clarify that studying the approximated model log-linearized around the
deterministic steady-state does not represent a limitation as serious as one
might initially think.
A paramount advantage of focusing on the nonlinearity induced by the
l o w e rb o u n da l o n ei st h a ti te c o n o m i z ei nt h ed i m e n s i o no ft h es t a t es p a c e .
A fully nonlinear setup would require instead an additional state variable to
keep track over time of the higher-order eﬀects of price dispersion, as shown
by Schmitt-Grohé and Uribe (2003).
3.2 Calibration to U.S. Economy
The optimal monetary policy problem introduced in the previous section is
calibrated to the U.S. economy. The baseline parametrization is summarized
in table 1.
The values assigned to the structural parameters of the economy are taken
from table 6.1 in Woodford (2003). Interestingly, the weight α derived from
the underlying structure of the economy is equal to 0.003 quarterly. This
is only a small fraction of unity that instead is commonly assumed in the
literature on the evaluation of monetary policy rules, based on the idea that
the central bank should give equal weight to its stabilization objectives.
In addition, following Christiano, Eichenbaum and Evans (2001) and the
estimates of Giannoni and Woodford (2003), the degree of inﬂation indexa-
tion θ is set close to unity, namely 0.99. This takes into account that in the
limiting case of full inﬂation indexation (θ =1 )the optimal nonlinear policy
for the welfare-theoretic loss function, equation (1), is not well deﬁned. The
central bank would be stabilizing the pure change in the rate of inﬂation,
15The deterministic steady-state rate of inﬂation πss is the inﬂation rate that would
be observed when the state of the economy corresponds to the deterministic steady-state.
Only if certainty equivalence were to hold then πss =¯ π.
9πt−πt−1,r a t h e rt h a ni n ﬂation, πt. There would be no tension between inﬂa-
tion stabilization and a higher long-run average rate of inﬂation in protecting
the economy from the lower bound.
The parameters that describe the evolution of the exogenous real-rate
shock rn
t are set to the estimates of Adam and Billi (2003a). An equilib-
rium value of 3.5% annually, implying a quarterly discount factor of 0.9913,
standard deviation 1.6% annually and autoregressive coeﬃcient of 0.8.
The robustness of the results obtained for the baseline calibration is
checked by solving the monetary policy problem also under the alternative
assumption of a much lower equilibrium value of the real-rate shock, say 2%
annually. Lowering the equilibrium value is of interest since it is equivalent
to increasing the variability of the real-rate disturbance, implying that the
economy would be more often than usual in a situation of zero nominal rates.
Al o w e re q u i l i b r i u mv a l u eo ft h er e a l - r a t es h o c km a ya l s ob ei n t e r p r e t e da s
due to a reduction in the expected growth rate of government expenditures.
4 Optimal Policy
The policy problem outlined in the previous section is solved assuming that
the central bank can credibly commit to its policy plans. The solution
method and the numerical algorithm employed are explained in appendixes
A.1 and A.2, respectively. This section illustrates the main ﬁndings. All
variables are expressed in terms of annualized percentage points.
4.1 Buﬀer Role of Inﬂation
Discussed for ﬁrst are the eﬀects of inﬂa t i o ni n d e x a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m yo n
the stochastic distribution of inﬂation. The model is nonlinear and certainty
equivalence breaks down, therefore, the long-run average rate of inﬂation ¯ π
will in general diﬀer from the deterministic steady-state rate of inﬂation πss.
Depicted in each plot of ﬁgure 1 are two sets of statistics, one with the
zero lower bound being imposed (ZLB) and another with the nominal interest
10rate allowed to become negative (LQ). The degree of inﬂation indexation θ
ranges from zero, corresponding to the purely forward-looking case, to the
baseline value of 0.99 implying almost full indexation.
The top panel of ﬁgure 1 shows that the optimal long-run average rate of
inﬂation consistent with the lower bound is increasing in the degree of inﬂa-
tion indexation.16 The inﬂation buﬀer, from less than 1 basis point annually
in the purely-forward looking case, rises to about 79 basis points annually
with almost full inﬂation indexation. This reveals that inﬂation inertia in
the economy needs to be taken appropriately into account in assessing the
practical signiﬁcance of the buﬀer role of inﬂation.
T h em i d d l ep a n e lo fﬁgure 1 depicts the standard deviation of inﬂation
over the degree of inﬂation indexation. Together with the ﬁrst panel, this
shows that there is a positive relation between the inﬂation buﬀer and the
standard deviation of inﬂation. A positive correlation between the level and
the volatility of inﬂation is a well-known empirical feature of the data. The
model abstracts from exogenous ‘cost-push’ shocks, therefore, the inﬂation
buﬀer and the volatility of inﬂation are due solely to the policy trade-oﬀ that
arises from the zero lower bound.
The bottom panel of ﬁgure 1 illustrates how inﬂation indexation trans-
lates into actual inﬂation persistence in the economy. The autocorrelation of
inﬂation is higher with the zero lower bound, than without. The asymmetry
in the stochastic distribution of inﬂation arising from the lower bound adds
inertia to the inﬂation process. In the purely-forward looking case the au-
tocorrelation of inﬂation is about 0.73 with the lower bound and only about
0.49 without. However, for almost full inﬂation indexation in the economy
it rises above 0.99 both with and without the lower bound; the diﬀerence
is almost indistinguishable. Interestingly, this implies that a high level of
inﬂa t i o ni n e r t i aa so b s e r v e di nt h ed a t aw o u l db ec o n s i s t e n tw i t ht h ec e n t r a l
bank either taking into account the lower bound or neglecting it.
16The statistics reported for the stochastic distribution of inﬂation, i.e., mean, standard
deviation and autocorrelation, are computed from a stochastic simulation of one-million
model periods on the optimal policy, see appendix A.2.
11To further clarify the practical relevance of the inﬂation buﬀer, ﬁgure 2
depicts the average occurrence of zero nominal interest rates as a function
o ft h ed e g r e eo fi n ﬂation indexation in the economy. Both with the zero
lower bound being imposed (ZLB) and without (LQ). Taking into account
the lower bound, a higher degree of indexation in the economy entails that
zero nominal interest rates occur less often. For the purely-forward looking
case the lower bound would bind about one quarter every 15 years on average.
While for almost full inﬂation indexation zero nominal rates are encountered
about one quarter every 218 years on average only.
Figure 2 also reveals that for a low degree of inﬂation indexation zero
nominal rates occur more frequently if the zero lower bound is being imposed.
Instead, for a suﬃciently high degree of inﬂation indexation zero nominal
rates occur less frequently if there is a lower bound. 17
4.2 Policy Responses
Figure 3 displays optimal policy responses (y,π,i) and optimal expectation
responses (Ey0,Eπ0,Ei 0) to a real-rate shock.18 Depicted in each plot are
three sets of optimal responses. With the zero lower bound imposed (ZLB,
θ =0or 0.99) and with the nominal interest rate allowed to become negative
(LQ). Interestingly, the linear-quadratic approximation of the policy prob-
lem is independent of the degree of inﬂation indexation θ, since the model
abstracts from ‘cost-push’ shocks.
In particular, ﬁgure 3 shows that without lower bound a real-rate shock
would not generate any policy trade-oﬀ, i.e., the required real-rate could be
implemented, at least theoretically, through variations in the nominal rate
alone, leaving both output at potential and inﬂation at zero. Instead, taking
17Section 4.3 shows that a higher degree of inﬂation indexation reduces the amount of
preemptive easing of nominal interest rates.
18Policies and expectations are displayed for a range of ±4 unconditional standard devia-
tions of the real-rate shock. To improve readability, the other state variables not shown on
the x-axes are all set to zero. This assumes that the monetary authority faces no past com-
mitments and that there was no inﬂation in the previous period, i.e., µ1 = µ2 = π−1 =0 ,
see appendix A.1.
12into account the zero lower bound, for a suﬃciently strong adverse real-
rate shock the central bank will not be able to further lower nominal rates
once the bound is binding. As depicted, with a zero (more generally, with a
suﬃciently small) degree of inﬂation indexation in the economy, output starts
falling below potential and deﬂation arises. These are features commonly
associated with the concept of a ‘liquidity trap.’ However, if the degree
of inﬂation indexation is suﬃciently high optimal policy generates inﬂation,
rather than deﬂation
This striking result of output losses being associated with rising inﬂation
due to the presence of the zero lower bound on nominal rates can be inter-
preted in the follow manner. Once the lower bound is reached, to achieve a
reduction in the real-rate of interest and stimulate aggregate demand in the
economy, the central bank needs to promise future inﬂation. As one may in-
fer from the aggregate-supply relation, equation (2), the higher is the degree
of inﬂation indexation in the economy the more inﬂation has to be promised
in order to contain the deﬂationary pressure. A larger inﬂation promise may
not only reduce the deﬂationary pressure but actually drive inﬂation up. Im-
portantly, this outcome relies on the assumption that the central bank can
credibly commit to carry out an inﬂationary policy in the future, after the
economy has evolved out of the binding lower bound.19
4.3 Preemptive Easing
Figure 4 illustrates in greater detail the optimal nominal interest rate re-
sponse, i, and also the optimal real-rate response, i − Eπ0,t oar e a l - r a t e
shock. Again, depicted in each plot are three sets of optimal responses. With
the zero lower bound imposed (ZLB, θ =0or 0.99)a n dw i t ht h en o m i n a l
interest rate allowed to become negative (LQ).
19Adam and Billi (2003b) study optimal monetary policy in a similar model but under
discretion, i.e., assuming that the central bank is unable to inﬂuence expectations of the
future course of policy. They show that the zero lower bound entails a deﬂation bias,
rather than an inﬂation buﬀer. Moreover, inﬂation persistence causes the real interest
rate to remain undesirably high for a longer period of time, signiﬁcantly increasing the
amount of deﬂation associated with adverse real-rate shocks.
13The two panels of ﬁgure 4 reveal that ‘preemptive’ easing of nominal
(and real) interest rates is optimal in the run-up to a binding lower bound.
Nominal (and real) rates are lowered more rapidly than without the lower
bound. To understand why this is the case one should note, looking back at
ﬁgure 3, in response to an adverse real-rate shock expected output is falling
already before the lower bound is actually reached, while output is yet at
potential. This is consistent with the intertemporal IS relation, equation (3).
Once the lower bound starts to bind and the central bank is promising future
inﬂation, output is expected to rise above potential. Then a further slide in
output commences to drag down also expected output.
Furthermore, the top panel of ﬁgure 4 discloses that a higher degree of
inﬂation indexation in the economy reduces the optimal amount of ‘preemp-
tive’ easing of nominal rates. Expected output needs to falls by less while
o u t p u ti sy e ta tp o t e n t i a l( c f r .ﬁgure 3). And the lower panel shows that the
central bank needs to generate a smaller reduction in the real interest rate
once at the lower bound, since it promises more future inﬂation (cfr. ﬁgure
3).
4.4 Dynamic Responses
Figure 5 displays the dynamic responses of the economy (y,π − ¯ π,i,) to
a real-rate shock, namely −3 unconditional standard deviations below its
baseline equilibrium value of 3.5% annually.20 This represents a relatively
large adverse real-rate shock, that would push it down to −1.3% annually.
As argued by Krugman (1998), negative real rates are plausible even if the
marginal product of physical capital remains positive. For instance agents
20Since in this nonlinear model certainty equivalence fails to hold, results are discussed
in terms of the implied ‘mean dynamics’ in response to the real-rate shock, instead of the
more familiar deterministic impulse responses. The mean dynamics are computed as the
average of 10,000 stochastic simulations. The initial values of the other state variables
are set equal to their respective unconditional average values. Setting them instead to
conditional average values consistent with the real-rate shock does not make a noticeable
diﬀerence.
14may require a large equity premium, e.g., historically observed in the U.S.,
or the price of physical capital may be expected to decrease.
Depicted in each plot of ﬁgure 5 are two sets of mean responses, with
t h ed e g r e eo fi n ﬂa t i o ni n d e x a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m y ,θ, being either 0 or the
baseline 99%. Both sets with the lower bound. The ﬁgure clariﬁes that with
more inﬂa t i o ni n d e x a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m yi n ﬂation and inﬂation promises of
the central bank rise higher above average and are kept high for longer.21 For
almost full indexation after ﬁve quarters inﬂation rises more than 20 basis
points annually above its long-run average value; then converges back to
average only very slowly. Interestingly, inﬂation is still above average a long
time after real and nominal interest rates have returned to their respective
average values. In contrast, with no (more generally, with a lower degree of)
inﬂa t i o ni n d e x a t i o ni nt h ee c o n o m yi n ﬂation rises by less and returns more
rapidly, than real and nominal interest rates, to its long-run average value.
5T r a d i t i o n a l L o s s F u n c t i o n
The previous section illustrated the main ﬁndings of the model when assum-
ing that the central bank follows the prescriptions of a welfare-theoretic loss
function. As a robustness exercise, in this section an alternative speciﬁcation
of the loss function is employed. Table 2 summarizes the implications for the
optimal inﬂation buﬀer.
The monetary policy problem is solved replacing the welfare-theoretic ob-
jective of the central bank, equation (1), with a loss function more commonly
employed in the monetary policy literature:
max
(yt,πt,it)
− E0
∞ X
t=0
β
t ¡
π
2
t + αy
2
t
¢
(6)
21T h em e a np a t ho fi n ﬂation tells also the evolution of expected inﬂation, since the
average rate of inﬂation in period n corresponds to the average rate of inﬂation that in
period n0 <nis expected for period n. The same can be said for all the mean responses
of the economy.
15where it is inﬂation, πt, instead of the change in the rate of inﬂation, πt −
θπt−1, that should be stabilized around zero.
As explained in section 3.2, the weight α derived from the underlying
structure of the economy is equal to 0.003 quarterly. This is only a small
fraction of unity that instead is commonly assumed in the literature, based
on the idea that the central bank should give equal weight to its stabilization
objectives. Therefore, the monetary policy problem is solved both for the
baseline value of the weight α =0 .003 and for α =1 .
Table 2 reports the optimal inﬂation buﬀer corresponding to the three
alternative speciﬁcations of the loss function, i.e., the ‘welfare-theoretic,’ the
‘traditional’ and the traditional with ‘equal weight.’ The table shows the
inﬂation buﬀer for the baseline value of the equilibrium real-rate of 3.5%.
Also shown is the buﬀer for a much lower equilibrium value of 2%,i m p l y i n g
that the economy would be more often than usual in a situation of zero
nominal rates. With the traditional loss function the buﬀer is less than 1
basis point annually for the baseline calibration; rising only to 4 basis points
annually for the lower equilibrium real-rate. This is in sharp contrast with
the welfare-theoretic case where the buﬀer is much higher at about 0.8%
annually for the baseline calibration; it rises to almost 1.9% annually for
the lower equilibrium real-rate. The equal weight loss function appears an
intermediate case in terms of the buﬀer, being at about 0.1% annually for
t h eb a s e l i n ea n da b o u t0.5% annually for the lower equilibrium real-rate.
Figure 6 displays optimal policy responses (y,π,i) to a real-rate shock,
with the traditional loss function in the left-hand panel and with the tradi-
tional loss function with equal weight in the right-hand panel. Depicted in
each plot are three sets of optimal responses. With the zero lower bound
imposed (ZLB, θ =0or 0.99) and with the nominal interest rate allowed
to become negative (LQ). The ﬁgure shows that with the equal weight the
maximum output losses to and adverse real-rate shock would be roughly only
one third of those with the traditional loss function. Because more volatility
of inﬂation is tolerated by the central bank, relative to volatility of output.
16This also explains why the inﬂation buﬀer is larger with the equal weight.
Figure 7 illustrates in greater detail the optimal nominal interest rate
response, i, and also the optimal real-rate response, i − Eπ0,t oar e a l - r a t e
shock. Again, with the traditional loss function in the left-hand panel and
with the equal weight in the right-hand panel. It can be seen that the tradi-
tional loss function entails far more ‘preemptive’ easing of nominal interest
rates. This is the case since the inﬂation buﬀer is lower and the risk of hitting
the lower bound is greater.
Figure 8 depicts the dynamic responses of the economy (y,π − ¯ π,i,) to
a real-rate shock, namely −3 unconditional standard deviations below its
baseline equilibrium value of 3.5% annually. Again, with the traditional loss
function in the left-hand panel and with the equal weight in the right-hand
panel. As shown, with the equal weight inﬂation would rise higher above its
long-run average value, then converges back to average at a lower pace. The
central bank is thus more successful in generating inﬂationary expectations.
6 Downward Nominal Rigidity
As a further robustness exercise, in this section the policy problem is solved
taking also into account potential downward nominal rigidity in the price-
setting behavior of ﬁrms. Table 3 summarizes the implications on the optimal
inﬂation buﬀer.
Besides the zero lower bound, another important argument for a positive
long-run average rate of inﬂation in the economy is a potential asymmetry
in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms, e.g., Summers (1991) and Krugman
(1998). This reﬂects the view that a positive rate of inﬂation may facilitate
wage adjustments in the economy when workers show resistance to wage bar-
gains requiring declines in nominal compensation (even if real wages were to
remain unchanged or rise because of declining aggregate prices). Resistance
to wage declines places upward pressure on the average level of real wage
17costs to ﬁrms, that may be inclined to pass them on to their prices, leading
to higher inﬂation at the aggregate level.22
A direct way of capturing the eﬀects on the economy of downward nom-
inal rigidity is to generalize the objective of the central bank, equation (1),
rendering it asymmetric as follows:
max
(yt,πt,it)
− E0
∞ X
t=0
β
t ¡
(πt − θπt−1)
2 + cπ
2
t + αy
2
t
¢
(7)
where c =0if πt ≥ 0 and c ≥ 0 if πt < 0. Therefore, if πt ≥ 0 the asym-
metric objective, equation (7), collapses to its earlier quadratic expression
(1). Instead, if πt < 0 a decline in the rate of inﬂation is more costly to the
e c o n o m yt h a na ne q u i v a l e n ti n c r e a s ei ni n ﬂation.
In the particular case of the ‘traditional’ loss function, introduced in
section 5, the asymmetric objective is ‘piecewise quadratic’ in πt.23 As an
illustrative example, the inﬂation component of the loss function is depicted
in ﬁgure 9 for an extreme value of c =1if πt < 0. This would imply that a
decline in the rate of inﬂation is 100% more costly to the economy than an
equal but opposite increase.
The model is solved with the asymmetric objective, equation (7), assum-
ing c =1if πt < 0. Table 3 reports the optimal inﬂation buﬀer corresponding
to the three alternative speciﬁcations of the loss function, i.e., the ‘welfare-
theoretic,’ the ‘traditional’ and the traditional with ‘equal weight.’ The table
shows that taking also into account the additional distortions due to poten-
tial downward nominal rigidities in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms can
potentially increase further the inﬂation buﬀer. However, it appears not to
22For an inﬂuential study on the sources and implications of downward nominal rigidity
see Akerlof, Dickens and Perry (1996). The authors present empirical and simulation-based
evidence supporting the prevalence of downward nominal rigidity in the U.S. economy and
its signiﬁcance for the economy’s performance, suggesting that an optimal inﬂation target
for monetary policy is greater than zero.
23The idea of introducing a piecewise quadratic criterion function in an economic policy
optimization framework ﬁnds an earlier treatment in Friedman (1975), Ch. 7, motivated
within the context of an international balance of payments example.
18have major implications beyond the eﬀects already due to the zero lower
bound.
7 Conclusions
This paper characterizes optimal monetary policy in a New Keynesian sticky-
price model with inﬂation inertia when nominal interest rates are bounded
below by zero. It is assumed that the central bank can credibly commit to
its policy plans. The model is calibrated to the U.S. economy and solved
employing nonlinear numerical methods.
Am a i nﬁnding is that the optimal long-run average rate of inﬂation
in the economy consistent with the zero lower bound is increasing in the
degree of inﬂation indexation. Therefore, a purely forward-looking version
of the model may severely underestimate the relevance of such an optimal
inﬂation buﬀer. For a reasonable calibration to the U.S. economy the model
prescribes a buﬀer of about 0.8% annually. A lower equilibrium value of
the real-rate shock, say 2% annually, could imply an even larger buﬀer of
about 1.9% annually. Replacing the welfare-theoretic loss function of the
central bank with a traditional objective, it appears that a less pronounced
buﬀer would suﬃce. The model is solved also introducing an asymmetry
in the inﬂation objective of the central bank to take into account potential
downward nominal rigidity in the price-setting behavior of ﬁrms. This seems
not to add signiﬁcantly to the inﬂation buﬀer.
These results highlight a number of fruitful avenues for future research.
First, the model abstracts from cost-push shocks that would shift the aggregate-
supply relation. It would be interesting to study the practical relevance of
introducing this further distortion into the economy, but would require fur-
ther progress in the numerical methodology developed. Second, other sources
of frictions could be introduced in the model, e.g., sticky-wages, again pend-
ing improvement in the numerical methods employed. Third, the interest
rate is assumed to be the only available policy instrument. It would be
useful to study the role of the exchange rate and distortionary taxation in
19mitigating the distortions imposed by the lower bound. Fourth, comparing
the optimal nonlinear policy with the performance of simple policy rules is
clearly of interest.
A Appendix
This appendix illustrates the solution method used for solving the optimal
policy problem and the numerical algorithm employed.
A.1 Solving the Model
The optimal monetary policy problem, equations (1)-(5), is not recursive,
since constraints (2) and (3) involve forward-looking variables.24. However, a
recursive formulation can be derived based on the corresponding Lagrangian
of the inﬁnite horizon problem.
Speciﬁcally, applying the method proposed by Marcet and Marimon (1998)
the problem can be reformulated as:
W (st)=i n f
x1
sup
x2
{h(st,x 1t,x 2t)+βEtW (st+1)} (8)
s.t.
µ1
t+1 = γ1
t,µ 1
0 =0
µ2
t+1 = γ2
t,µ 2
0 =0
rn
t+1 =( 1 − ρr)¯ r + ρrrn
t + εr
t+1
it ≥ 0
where s =( µ1,µ 2,π−1,r n) ⊂ R4 is the state space, x1 =( γ1,γ2) and x2 =
(y,π,i) are the vectors of controls, and the one-period return is
24Solving the optimal policy problem with downward nominal rigidity in the price setting
behavior of ﬁrms, in section 6, the quadratic loss function of the monetary authority,
equation (1), is replaced with the generalized asymmetric objective, equation (7).
20h(st,x 1t,x 2t) ≡− αy2
t − (πt − θπt−1)
2
+γ1
t
³
πt − 1
1+βθ (θπt−1 + λyt)
´
− µ1
t
1
1+βθπt
+γ2
t (yt + σ(it − rn
t )) − µ2
t
1
β (σπt + yt)
The reformulated problem, equation (8), is a recursive saddle point func-
tional equation, i.e., a generalized Bellman equation. It requires maximiza-
tion with respect to the policies x2 =( y,π,i); and minimization with respect
to the Lagrange multipliers x1 =( γ1,γ2) of the constraints (2) and (3) that
contain forward-looking variables.
Besides the two original state variables (π−1,r n), there are now two addi-
tional co-state variables (µ1,µ 2), given by the lagged values of the Lagrange
multipliers. These can be interpreted as measuring the marginal value costs
of ‘promises’ that have to be kept from past policy commitments.
Associated with the policy functions are the expectation functions:
Etyt+1 =
Z
yt
¡
γ
1
t,γ
2
t,πt,(1 − ρr)¯ r + ρrr
n
t + ε
r
t+1
¢
f
¡
ε
r
t+1
¢
d
¡
ε
r
t+1
¢
Etπt+1 =
Z
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where f (·) is the probability density function of the stochastic shock innova-
tion εr. Assuming normality of the innovation, the expectation functions can
be approximated by Gaussian-Hermite quadrature, as explained in appendix
A.2.
A.2 Numerical Algorithm
One has to rely on nonlinear numerical methods to solve for the value function
and optimal policy functions of the reformulated problem, equation (8). In
particular, the collocation method can be employed.25
25For more detailed expositions of the collocation method see, e.g., Ch. 11 in Judd
(1998) and Ch.s 6 and 9 in Miranda and Fackler (2002).
21In particular, the state space s =( µ1,µ 2,π−1,r n) ⊂ R4 is discretized into
a set of N collocation nodes ℵ = {sn|n =1 ,...,N },w h e r esn ∈ s.T h ev a l u e
function W (·) is interpolated over the collocation nodes sn by using a four
dimensional cubic spline φ(·) and choosing basis coeﬃcients cn such that
W (sn) ≈
N X
n=1
cnφ(sn) (9)
Equation (9) is an approximation to the left-hand side of the reformulated
problem, equation (8). Then to evaluate the right-hand side of equation
(8) one approximates the expected value EW (g(sn,x 1,x 2,ε)),w h e r eg(·)
denotes the state transition function, x1 =( γ1,γ2) and x2 =( y,π,i) are the
vectors of controls, and ε is the innovation of the stochastic shock process.
Assuming normality of the innovation, the expected value function can be
approximated by Gaussian-Hermite quadrature, which involves discretizing
the shock distribution into a set of quadrature nodes εm, and associated
probability weights ωm,f o rm =1 ,...,M.26
Substituting the collocation equation (9) for the value function W (g(·)),
the right-hand side of the reformulated problem, equation (8), can be ap-
proximated over the collocation nodes sn as
RHS (sn) ≈ inf
x1
sup
x2
(
h(sn,x)+β
M X
m=1
N X
n=1
ωmcnφ(g(sn,x,ε m))
)
(10)
The minimization/maximization with respect to x =( x1,x 2) in problem
(10) may be solved using a standard Quasi-Newton optimization method, by
taking into account the bounded control it ≥ 0.T h i sd e l i v e r sRHS (·) and
the policy functions x(·) at the collocation nodes sn.
Finally, equating equations (9) and (10) at each collocation node sn de-
livers an approximation to the reformulated problem, equation (8). This
26For details on applying Gaussian-Hermite quadrature see, e.g., Ch. 7 in Judd (1998).
22deﬁnes a nonlinear equations system with unknown basis coeﬃcients cn that
can compactly expressed in vector form as the collocation equation
Φcn = RHS (cn) (11)
The collocation equation (11) may be solved using any nonlinear equation
solution method. In particular, one can rewrite the collocation equation as a
ﬁxed-point problem cn = Φ−1RHS (cn) and employ function iteration, with
iterative update rule
cn ←− Φ
−1RHS (cn) (12)
Alternatively, the collocation equation can be rewritten as a rootﬁnding
problem Φcn − RHS (cn)=0and solved using Newton’s method, which
implies the iterative update rule
cn ←− cn − [Φ − RHS
0 (cn)]
−1 [Φcn − RHS (cn)] (13)
where RHS0 (cn) is the n × n Jacobian of RHS (·) at cn.
The Algorithm proceeds as follows:
Step 1: Choose the degree of approximation N and M and set the appropri-
ate collocation and quadrature nodes. Guess an initial basis coeﬃcient
vector c0
n.
Step 2: Iterate on (12) or (13) and update the basis coeﬃcient vector ck
n to
ck+1
n .
Step 3: Stop if max
¯ ¯ck
n − ck+1
n
¯ ¯ <τ,w h e r eτ>0 is a convergence tolerance
level. Otherwise repeat step 2.
Once convergence is achieved the accuracy of the solution has to be
checked. For this, deﬁne the residual function
23R(sr)=RHS (cr) −
R X
n=1
cnφ(sr)
that measures the approximation error between the right- and left-hand sides
of the reformulated problem, equation (8), at an arbitrary grid of nodes
< = {sr|r =1 ,...,R },w h e r esr ∈ S and < ∩ℵ = ∅. And check the
maximum approximation error, max|R(·)|, over the grid of nodes sr.
For the baseline calibration the optimal monetary policy problem is solved
using Newton’s method, setting N = 3375 and M =9 . Relatively more nodes
are placed in areas of the state space where the value and policy functions
display a higher degree of curvature and kinks, respectively. It is important
to economize in this way assigning the nodes since the problem has a four
dimensional state space and is challenging to solve. The support of the collo-
cation nodes is chosen to cover ±4 unconditional standard deviations of the
exogenous state (rn) and to insure that all values of the endogenous states
(µ1,µ 2,π−1) lie inside the state space when using the solution to stochas-
tically simulate one-million model periods. Since this can only be veriﬁed
after convergence is achieved some experimentation is necessary. The data
generated by the simulation is then used to compute the statistics describing
the stochastic distribution of the optimal policy.
The initial guess for the basis coeﬃcient vector c0
n is set to the solution of
the problem without zero lower bound. The tolerance level is τ =1 .49·10−8,
i.e., the square root of machine precision. Convergence and the computation
of the residual function takes about 1/2 hour on a Pentium IV with 3.0 GHz.
The maximum approximation error is less than 0.0008,w h e r e< contained
more than 35,000 nodes.
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28Structural parameters
Downward nominal rigidity c(π<0) 0
Quarterly weight on output gap α 0.003
Quarterly discount factor β
¡
1+ ¯ r
4
¢−1 ≈ 0.9913
Slope of AS relation λ 0.024
Real-rate elasticity of output gap σ 6.25
Degree of inﬂation indexation θ 0.99
Real-rate shock
Annually equilibrium value ¯ r 3.5%
Annually standard deviation s.d.(rn)1 .6%
AR(1)-coeﬃcient ρr 0.8
Table 1: Baseline calibration
¯ r Welfare-theoretic Traditional Equal weight
3.5% 79 < 11 0
2.0% 189 4 53
Table 2: Optimal inﬂation buﬀer with lower equilibrium real-rate (b.p.s)
c(π<0) Welfare-theoretic Traditional Equal weight
0 79 < 11 0
1 79 3 17
Table 3: Optimal inﬂation buﬀer with downward nominal rigidity (b.p.s)
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Figure 1: Stochastic distribution of inﬂation
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Figure 2: Frequency of zero nominal rates
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Figure 3: Optimal policy responses to real-rate shocks
32−0.5 0 0.5 1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
Optimal Policy, r
n shock
r
n
i
−0.5 0 0.5 1
−0.5
0
0.5
1
i
 
−
 
E
p
i
r
n
LQ
ZLB (theta = 0)
ZLB (theta = 0.99)
Figure 4: Preemptive easing
330 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−2
−1
0
1
Mean Path, r
n
0 = −3σ
r
n
y
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
−0.1
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
p
i
 
−
 
p
i
b
a
r
0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20
0
1
2
3
4
5
i
ZLB (theta = 0)
ZLB (theta = 0.99)
Figure 5: Mean responses to real-rate shocks
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Figure 6: Optimal policy responses (Alternative loss function)
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Figure 7: Preemptive easing (Alternative loss function)
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Figure 8: Mean responses (Alternative loss function)
37−1 −0.5 0 0.5 1
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Asymmetric Inflation Objective
pi
2pi
2 if  pi < 0
 pi
2
Figure 9: Downward nominal rigidity
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